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PERSONAL INJURY LAW-Comparative Negligence and
the Obvious Danger Rule: Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Generally, "there is no obligation to protect the invitee against dangers
which are known to him, or which are so obvious and apparent that he
may reasonably be expected to discover them."' In Klopp v. Wackenhut
Corp.,2 however, the New Mexico Supreme Court indicated that the
general rule, known as the obvious danger doctrine, is not so clear-cut
anymore.
In Klopp, the court held that an occupier of a place of public accommodation owes a duty to safeguard all business visitors whom the
occupier may reasonably foresee being injured by danger that is avoidable
when the occupier uses reasonable precautions.' The court injected into
its reasoning the4 abrogation, by comparative negligence, of the obvious
danger doctrine.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 27, 1988, Nancy Klopp was at Albuquerque International
Airport on her way to catch her departing TWA flight.' She passed
through the metal detector, owned by the airline and operated by Wackenhut, setting off the alarm. 6 Klopp removed some jewelry and placed
it in a tray on an adjacent table. She went through the metal detector
again. 7 The alarm did not sound the second time, so Klopp's attention
turned to her jewelry.' She moved to her left, toward the jewelry. 9 Klopp
tripped over the stanchion base of the metal detector, which protruded
about eighteen inches, suffering injuries to her left leg and right knee.' 0
On August 22, 1988, Klopp filed a personal injury suit against the
Wackenhut Corp. and against Trans World Airlines, Inc. in Bernalillo
County District Court."
After Klopp presented her case, the trial court granted TWA and
Wackenhut a directed verdict.' 2 Klopp took the case to the court of
1. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 427 (5th ed. 1984 &
Supp. 1988) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
2. 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293 (1992).
3. Id. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 155, 824 P.2d at 295.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Brief in Chief for Petitioner at 1, Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d
293 (1992) (No. 19,318).
12. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 154, 824 P.2d at 294.
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appeals, which affirmed, deferring to the New Mexico Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari. 3 Because Wackenhut lacked authority to rearrange the equipment, the supreme court affirmed the directed verdict
in its favor.' The court, however, reversed the directed verdict in favor
of TWA and remanded the case for a jury trial. 5
III.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is important to know the law of occupiers of land, contributory
negligence, and comparative negligence to understand Klopp's effect on
the obvious danger rule. Discussion of those areas follows.
A nineteenth century English case established the rule that the occupier
of premises has a duty to protect those who enter those premises to do
business with the occupier, upon the occupier's express or implied invitation, against dangers that the occupier knows or might discover with
reasonable care.' 6 Such a business visitor is called an invitee. 7 A customer
in a store is a typical example.' 8 Nancy Klopp was an invitee at the
airport. ,9
Invitees who encountered obvious dangers, though, were outside the
protection of occupiers-the obvious danger doctrine required the invitee
to protect himself against obvious dangers.20 Courts typically required
the occupier to exercise reasonable care, and interpreted that to mean a
warning of danger. 2'
Before 1981, New Mexico recognized the defense of contributory negligence in personal injury cases.Y One treatise's definition of contributory
negligence is:
conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
[A]lthough
he is required to conform for his own protection ....
the defendant has violated his duty, has been negligent, and would
because his own
otherwise be liable, the plaintiff is denied recovery
23
conduct disentitles him to maintain the action.
Contributory negligence is a harsh doctrine for plaintiffs. 24 The doctrine
bars a plaintiff from any recovery if he acts even slightly outside the
community standard of conduct, though the defendant's negligence may

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 155, 824 P.2d at 295.
Id. at 161, 824 P.2d at 301.
Id.at 162, 824 P.2d at 302.
Indermaur v. Dames, I L.R.-C.P. 274 (1866).
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 419,

18. Id.
19. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 155, 824 P.2d at 295.
KEETON, supra note 1, at 427.
21. Id.
22. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
23. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 451-52.
24. Id.at 468.

20. PROSSER &
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be extreme. 25 To correct the problem, courts turned 26to allocation of
damages under the doctrine of comparative negligence.

In the 1981 case of Scott v. Rizzo, 27 New Mexico joined the many
jurisdictions, both within the United States and without, 2 that had replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence. In Scott, the
New Mexico Supreme Court adopted a "pure" comparative negligence
standard .29 "Pure" comparative negligence apportions fault between or

among negligent parties and total damages in proportion to the fault of

each party.30
Nancy Klopp argued that the obvious danger doctrine was a contributory
negligence bar to her cause of action." As such, the obvious danger
doctrine was
thereby incompatible with comparative negligence, according
32
to Klopp.

IV.

DISCUSSION OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE

Shortly after affirming the trial court's decision in Klopp,33 the New
Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the issue of the foreseeable behavior
of invitees in Davis v. Gabriel.3 4 According to the supreme court in
Klopp, the court of appeals in Davis correctly applied section 384 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 5 The Davis court held that one who
creates a danger on behalf of a land
occupier enjoys the same freedom
36
from liability as the land occupier.
With regard to the duty a land occupier has to protect invitees, however,
the court of appeals sent mixed signals:
[D]espite the obviousness of the danger, a jury could find that a
possessor for occupier] of land breached a duty to invitees if (1) the
possessor could have reasonably foreseen that invitees exercising due

25. Id. at 468-69.

26. Id. at 470-71.
27. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).

28. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 470.
29. Scott, 96 N.M. at 690, 634 P.2d at 1242. The other forms of comparative negligence are
"modified" and "slight-gross." In a modified comparative negligence system, a plaintiff is not
barred from recovery so long as his contributory negligence is below a specified percentage of the
total fault. In a slight-gross system, the plaintiff's contributory negligence is a bar to recovery unless
it is slight and the defendant's negligence, by comparison, is gross. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
1, at 473-74.
30. Scott, 96 N.M. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240.
31. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 156, 824 P.2d at 296.
32. Id.

33. Id.at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
34. 111 N.M. 289, 804 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1990).

35. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297. The Restatement provides that:
[oine who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other
condition on the land is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same freedom
from liability, as though he were the possessor of the land, for physical harm
caused to others upon and outside of the land by the dangerous character of the
structure or other condition while the work is in his charge.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 384 (1964).
36. Davis, 111 N.M. at 291, 804 P.2d at I110, cited with approval in Klopp, 113 N.M. at 157,
824 P.2d at 297.
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care would be injured by the condition of the land and (2) that risk
made it unreasonable for the possessor not to take certain precautions.
Whether a particular precaution would be required depends on such
the probability of harm,
factors as the expense of the precaution,
37
and the probable extent of harm.
TWA contended in Klopp that the above passage meant that it had3
no duty to design the metal detector "for klutzes and total idiots."
TWA pointed out that more than a million people had passed through
the metal detector, yet Klopp's accident was the only one of its kind
on record. a9

The supreme court in Klopp disagreed with TWA's argument and
sought to clarify the matter, holding that "in a place of public accommodation, an occupier of the premises owes a duty to safeguard each
business visitor whom the occupier reasonably may foresee could be
injured by a danger avoidable through reasonable precautions available
to the occupier of the premises." 4
It seems the court hinged its decision on foreseeability. 4' It pointed
out an important difference between the foreseeable behavior of reasonably
careful visitors, and the foreseeable behavior of business visitors. 42 "Simply
by making hazards obvious to reasonably prudent persons," the court
reasoned, "the occupier of premises cannot avoid liability to a business
visitor for injuries caused by dangers that otherwise may be made safe
through reasonable means. A risk is not made reasonable simply because
it is made open and obvious to persons exercising ordinary care." ' 43 The
court cited a products liability case, Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 44 that
up with such a conclusion fourteen
applied New Mexico law and came
45
years before the Klopp decision.
46
When the supreme court reversed the directed verdict in favor of TWA,
it explained that "some degree of negligence on the part of all persons
is foreseeable, just like the inquisitive propensities of children, and thus,
should be taken into account by the occupant in the exercise of ordinary
care." '47 Cases holding that liability can be avoided by an adequate49
warning, such as Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper," were categorically overruled.

37. Davis, at 292, 804 P.2d at ItI.
38. Oral argument of Respondent TWA, quoted in Klopp, 113 N.M. ai 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
39. Brief for Respondent TWA at 3, Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293
(1992) (No. 19-318).
40. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1978).
45. Id. at 1263. In Fabian, a worker was injured when the punch press he was operating doublepunched. The jury found for the plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that even though
the danger was open and obvious, the liability of the manufacturer was not absolved. Id. at 1259,
1263.
46. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 162, 824 P.2d at 302.
47. Id. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
48. 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977).
49. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
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Although it abrogated the obvious danger rule in Klopp, 5° the New
Mexico Supreme Court may have already had the ammunition it needed
to enforce something beyond a duty to warn. 5 According to section 343A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the New Mexico Supreme
Court adopted in the 1972 slip-and-fall case of Proctor v. Waxier,12 the
occupier may be required to provide something more than a warning,
even when the danger is obvious. 5 A situation where there is reason to
expect that the invitee might be distracted, as Nancy Klopp was,5 4 may
warrant additional precautions.5 5 Without abrogating the rule, a North
Carolina court held that the anticipation of an invitee being distracted
from an obvious danger by a merchandise display warranted something
more than a warning. 56 Likewise, several courts have held that a shopper
with an arm full of
bundles may be anticipated to overlook an obvious
57
danger in a store.
TWA, in fact, admitted that the obvious danger doctrine would not
necessarily bar Klopp from recovery.5" "The rule merely defines the duty
owed by premises owners and operators," the airline stated.5 9
Still, the court threw Klopp's distraction into the comparative negligence
mix, 6 ° a mix that Klopp argued was discordant with the obvious danger
rule.6 The court solved the problem by citing cases from Idaho, 62 Michigan, 63 Missouri, 6" Oregon, 65 Texas," Utah, 67 and Wyoming," all of
which abolished the obvious danger doctrine in light of comparative

negligence. 69 Among the factors to go into the mix are whether the danger

could be avoided if the invitee were warned, the severity of the possible
injury, the
possibility of distracting the invitee, and the obscurity of the
70
danger.

50. Id. at 155, 160, 824 P.2d at 295, 300.
51. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 427; cf Fabian v. E.W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257
(10th Cir. 1978) (obviousness of danger in products liability case does not relieve defendant of
liability).
52. 84 N.M. 361, 503 P.2d 644 (1972).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f (1964).
54. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 160, 824 P.2d at 300.
55. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 427.
56. Norwood v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 279 S.E.2d 559 (1981).
57. See Seng v. American Stores Co., 121 A.2d 123 (Pa. 1956); Hansen v. Town & Country
Shopping Center, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1966); Stofer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 249 F.2d
285 (8th Cir. 1957).
58. Brief for Respondent at 8, Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293 (1992)
(No. 19,318).
59. Id.
60. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 160, 824 P.2d at 300.
61. Id. at 156, 824 P.2d at 296.
62. Harrison v. Taylor, 768 P.2d 1321 (Idaho 1989).
63. Riddle v. McLouth Steel Prod. Corp., 451 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
64. Cox v. J.C. Penney Co., 741 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
65. Woolston v. Wells, 687 P.2d 144 (Or. 1984) (en banc).
66. Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978).
67. Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah
1990).
68. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985).
69. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 158-59, 824 P.2d at 298-99.
70. Id. at 159 n.3, 824 P.2d at 299 n.3.
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The supreme court clearly intends for the job of weighing the factors
to go to the jury: 7' "[Tihe principal consideration is to minimize interference with the jury function so as not to erode the litigant's right to
trial by jury." '7 2 Thus, a directed verdict would only be proper when
there is no substantial evidence supporting any element of the case."
The supreme court found the substantial evidence standard to be
satisfied in Klopp's claim against Wackenhut. 74 TWA hired Wackenhut
to run its security station, including the metal detector. 7 The position
of the equipment was certified by the Federal Aviation Authority, and
76 Wackenhut
the position could not be changed without recertification.
77
was not allowed to reposition the equipment.
Because of Wackenhut's limited role with regard to the metal detector,78
its argument in defense of Klopp's claims was different from TWA's.
Wackenhut argued that its duty to passengers like Klopp was to keep
weapons off the plane and that it had no duty regarding
the positioning,
79
operation or maintainence of the metal detector.
Such an argument ignores the law of negligence. 0 Since Wackenhut
acted as TWA's agent, the appropriate law is in section 355 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, which states that:
[a]n agent who has the custody of land or chattels and who should
realize that there is an undue risk that their condition will cause harm
to the person, land, or chattels of others is subject to liability for
such harm caused during the continuance of his custody, by his failure
to use care to take such reasonable precautions as he is authorized
to take."'
Particularly relevant to Wackenhut is section 355 comment b: "If an
agent has only a limited control over land or chattels, he is subject to
liability only to the extent that he is authorized to exercise such control.' '82
Klopp pointed out that Wackenhut sometimes placed a wastebasket beside
the metal detector, detouring people around the protruding stanchion
base, and thereby asserting some control over the situation.83 The court
decided, however, that:
while Wackenhut certainly had a greater duty to passengers than
merely to search for weapons, [e.g., preventing its employees from

71. Id. at 159, 824 P.2d at 299.
72. Id. at 155, 824 P.2d at 295 (citing Melnick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 N.M.
726, 728-29, 749 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (1988)).
73. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 155, 824 P.2d at 295.
74. Id. at 161, 824 P.2d at 301.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 159-60, 824 P.2d at 299-300.
77. Id.at 160, 824 P.2d at 300.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 355 (1957).
82. Id. cmt. b.
83. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 161, 824 P.2d at 301.
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leaving suitcases where people might trip over them] that duty was
limited by the extent of its control over the chattels in its custody
or over the area that it occupied.84
Because Wackenhut lacked the authority to rearrange the equipment, the
supreme court affirmed its directed verdict and relieved it of liability."
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
6
In 1928, the famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.1
focused the law of negligence on the issue of foreseeability with regard
to duty.87 From that case came two views of such foreseeability that vie
for supremacy, even today, among American jurisdictions. 8
The Palsgrafmajority opinion, written by then-Judge Cardozo, imposed
no duty, and therefore the defendant was not liable to an unforeseeable
plaintiff. 89 In Judge Andrews's dissent, on the other hand, there is a
duty to all, even those who are unforeseeable, to refrain from unreasonably
dangerous acts. 90 Before Klopp, New Mexico appeared to be in a state
of confusion on the issue of whether defendants had a duty only to
foreseeable plaintiffs, or to unforeseeable plaintiffs, as well. 9'
Like foreseeability with regard to duty, there are two fundamental
theories as to the basis for the special duty of an occupier of land to
protect invitees, although there is general agreement that such a duty
exists. 92 The first is Professor Bohlen's economic benefit theory, 93 adopted
by the first Restatement of Torts. 94 Under that theory, the occupier's
duty to make the premises safe is in exchange for the economic benefits
the visitor can provide. 95 The second theory, adopted by many courts,
stresses the invitation of the business visitor. 96 According to this theory,
it is implied that the occupier has used reasonable care to make the place97
safe when he encourages people to enter his land to further his purpose.
It is important to note that there is no requirement for the occupier
to ensure the safety of the invitees. 98 The occupier's duty is only to use
reasonable care to protect them. 99 "But [that] obligation . . . is a full
one," according to commentators, "applicable in all respects, and extending to everything that threatens the invitee with an unreasonable risk
V.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.1928).
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 284.
Id. at 285.
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
Id. at 103.
See Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 66, 792 P.2d 36, 43 (1990) (Ransom, J.,dissenting).
PRoss R & KEETON, supra note 1, at 420.
Id.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 331, 343 cmt. a (1939).
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 420.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id. at 425.
Id.
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of harm."'0 Included within the scope of the obligation are the duties:

(1) of care not to injure the invitees negligently; (2) to warn of hidden
dangers known to the occupier; (3) to inspect and discover dangerous
conditions if they exist; and (4) to take reasonable precautions to protect
invitees from dangers that are foreseeable from the arrangement or use
of the property.' 0' The New Mexico Supreme Court issued its writ of
certiorari "to review, with respect to an obvious danger, the duty owed
business visitors by TWA as the occupier of the premises, and by Wack' 02
enhut as the operator of the station.'
According to TWA and Wackenhut, the metal detector was open and
obvious and there was no reason to believe it was dangerous. 0 3 Therefore,
they argued, they owed no duty of care to Klopp.' °4 Klopp argued that
the respondents had a duty to protect her from what she considered an
unreasonable risk of harm-the protruding stanchion base of the metal
detector. 05 Even if she was negligent, Klopp contended, "[that] does not
eliminate ... the duty [of] the defendant ...
[in relation to an open
and obvious danger]. '' °6
The question of duty was one that the New Mexico Defense Lawyers
Association explored in its amicus curiae brief for the respondents. 0 7
The Defense Lawyers argued that New Mexico courts, in both premises
and products liability cases, have long used the obvious danger doctrine
with regard to the duty to warn of known or obvious danger.108 To

illustrate the point, the Defense Lawyers cited a list of ten cases so
holding,'0 9 including Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper"° and Proctor v. Waxier."'

100. Id.
101. Id. at 425-26.
102. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 155, 824 P.2d at 295.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 156, 824 P.2d at 296.
106. Id.
107. Brief of New Mexico Defense Lawyers Ass'n, Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153,
824 P.2d 293 (1992) (No. 19,318).
108. Id.
109. The Defense Lawyers' list included: Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 498 P.2d 1359
(1972); Villanueva v. Nowlin, 77 N.M. 174, 420 P.2d 764 (1966); Romero v. Kendricks, 74 N.M.
24, 390 P.2d 269 (1964); Burgi v. Acid Eng'g, Inc., 104 N.M. 557, 724 P.2d 765 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 104 N.M. 460, 722 P.2d 1182 (1986); Arenivas v. Continental Oil Co., 102 N.M. 106, 692
P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 88, 691 P.2d 881 (1984); Jones v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 100 N.M. 268, 669 P.2d 744 (Ct. App. 1983); Michael v. Warner/Chilcott,
91 N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256 (1978); and
Perry v. Color Tile, 81 N.M. 143, 464 P.2d 562 (Ct. App. 1970). The list also includes those
mentioned in the text and cited in notes 111 and 112 below. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 156, 824 P.2d
at 296.
The Defense Lawyers also listed the few New Mexico cases where the plaintiff encountered an
obvious danger and was held to have assumed the risk: Dempsey v. Alamo Hotels, Inc., 76 N.M.
712, 418 P.2d 58 (1966); and Bogart v. Hester, 66 N.M. 311, 347 P.2d 327 (1959). Also listed
were the New Mexico cases in which the plaintiff encountered an obvious danger and was held to
have been contributorily negligent: Boyce v. Brewington, 49 N.M. 107, 158 P.2d 124 (1945); and
Wood v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 80 N.M. 164, 452 P.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1969). Klopp, 113
N.M. at 156 n.l, 824 P.2d at 296 n.l.
110. 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977).
111. 84 N.M. 361, 503 P.2d 644 (1972).
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The supreme court answered by stating that warning would be a false
issue if the nature of the risk would not be made more prominent by
additional warning."12 Instead, it turned its3 attention to the issue of duty,
irrespective of a specific duty to wain.1
On the subject of duty, the supreme court in Klopp found particular
fault with a point in the Davis opinion,' 4 where the court of appeals
stated: "The scope of the duty is determined by reference to the foreseeable
behavior of reasonably careful invitees, considered as a class.""' 5 The
Davis court went on to explain that "[tihe negligence of the particular
invitee is relevant only for purposes of reducing recovery under comparative negligence principles.""11

6

Still, the supreme court in Klopp rea-

soned that a lack of duty to foreseeably injured invitees injured through
contributory negligence would lessen the utility of comparative negligence,
and stated that:
(w]hile we fully understand that, absent a breach of duty, in logic
there can be no fault to compare, the fallacy in that argument is
that it is premised not on the foreseeable behavior of business visitors,
but on the foreseeable behavior of reasonably careful visitors. On
that premise, the negligence of a particular visitor is preclusive if
ambit of the foreseeable behavior of reasonably careful
outside the
7
visitors."

The court analogized to the law of products liability where the duty
is to use reasonable care in design, a duty that does not change if the
danger is obvious."" An occupier has no duty, though, if he has no
reason to know of an unreasonable risk of danger to an invitee." 9
Justice Ransom, writing the Klopp opinion, relied heavily on his dissent
in Calkins v. Cox Estates, 20 a 1990 case that defined the duty of a
landowner. In the Calkins dissent, Justice Ransom maintained that a
lack of duty toward an unforeseeable plaintiff is "a matter of public
policy.' ' 2' In Klopp, the majority accepted Justice Ransom's belief that
in New Mexico negligence actions: (1) the plaintiff must be foreseeable;
and (2) the risk he encountered must be unreasonable. 122 According to
Klopp, whether those two requirements are met is to be decided by the
2
jury in virtually every case. 1

112. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 156, 824 P.2d at 296.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
115. Davis v. Gabriel, III N.M. 289, 292, 804 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Ct. App. 1990).
116. Id.
117. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
118. Fabian v. E.W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 1978), cited with approval in
Klopp, 113 N.M. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
119. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 158, 824 P.2d at 298.
120. 110 N.M. 59, 66, 792 P.2d 36, 43 (1990) (Ransom, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 68, 792 P.2d at 45.
122. Id. at 67, 792 P.2d at 44, cited with approval in Klopp, 113 N.M. at 158, 824 P.2d at
298.
123. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 159, 824 P.2d at 299.
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"Negligence, proximate cause, and comparative fault are issues to be
decided by the jury whenever reasonable minds differ,' ' '24 the supreme
court summarized. Its holding in Klopp means juries in such cases will
now have to be instructed differently. 125 In situations where an obvious
danger injured an invitee, the standard under Uniform Jury Instruction
("UJI") 13-1310 was:
An [owner] [occupant] owes a duty to a business visitor, with
respect to known or obvious dangers, if and only if:
(1) The [owner] [occupant] knows or has reason to know of a
dangerous condition on his premises involving an unreasonable risk
of danger to a business visitor; and
(2) The [owner] [occupant] should reasonably anticipate that the
business visitor will not discover or realize the danger [or that harm
will result to the business visitor, even though the business visitor
knows or has reason to know of the danger].
If both of these conditions are found to exist, then the [owner]
[occupant] had a duty
to use ordinary care to protect the business
26
visitor from harm.'

The New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association, in its amicus curiae brief
for the petitioner, argued that the instruction is erroneous "because it
improperly constricts the occasions when a court can declare that a
landowner owes a duty of reasonable care as to known or obvious
27

dangers."'1

The supreme court held UJI 13-1310 to be unsuitable for comparative
fault cases because the "court must determine as a matter of law whether
a particular defendant owes a duty to a particular plaintiff."'' 2

If a duty
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is found, it is one of ordinary care to keep the premises safe for invitees.
Ordinary care is to be determined by the jury after receiving this instruction,'3 0 which provides:

"Ordinary care" is that care which a reasonably prudent person
would use in the conduct of his own affairs. What constitutes "ordinary care" varies with the nature of what is being done.
As the risk of danger that should reasonably be foreseen increases,
the amount of care required also increases. In deciding whether ordinary care has been used, the conduct in question must be considered
in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. 3'

124. Id. at 160, 824 P.2d at 300.
125. Id. at 159, 824 P.2d at 299.
126. N.M. U.J.1. Ciy. 13-1310.
127. Brief of New Mexico Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 824
P.2d 293 (1992) (No. 19,318).
128. Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 62, 824 P.2d 296, 299 (1990), quoted in Klopp, 113
N.M. at 159, 824 P.2d at 299.
129. N.M. U.J.1. Crv. 13-1309 ("An [owner] [occupier] owes a business visitor the duty to use
ordinary care to keep the premises safe for use by the business visitor.")
130. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 159, 824 P.2d at 299.
131. N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-1603.
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"Further," the supreme court directed, "the jury will be instructed
that to rise to the level of negligence an act must be one which a
foresee as involving an unreasonable
reasonably prudent person 1 would
2
risk of injury to another.1
Finally, in launching the new rule of law in the Klopp case, the supreme
court faced three possible times to begin application of that rule: (1)
after Klopp; (2) with Klopp and thereafter; or (3) with Klopp and before
and after.' 33 Nancy Klopp, of course, wanted the court to abrogate the
obvious danger doctrine in such a way that she could take advantage
of the change. 3 4 TWA argued that it relied "on the standard of duty
set forth in the mandatory instructions which were in effect at the time
of this accident."' 3 5 If the law were to change, TWA wanted it to do
so after Klopp. 3 6 Nancy Klopp countered by claiming the new rule would
not impose any significant new duties or conditions or eliminate any
existing rights. 37 The court decided to give Nancy Klopp the benefit of
the change. It remanded the cause against TWA to the district court for
a jury trial.' 38
VI.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the decision in Klopp, New Mexico land occupiers are
no longer shielded from liability to invitees by the obvious danger doctrine.
An occupier owes a duty to safeguard invitees whom the occupier may
reasonably foresee being injured by a danger on the premises that is
avoidable through reasonable precautions available to the occupier.
It is for the jury to determine liability from the comparative negligence
mix. Among the factors to be considered are avoidability and obscurity
of the danger, severity of the possible injury, and the possibility of
distracting the invitee. The foreseeability of the plaintiff and the unreasonableness of the risk are also for the jury to decide.
DANIEL M. FABER
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